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LENDERS' PERCEPTION OF BORROWER 
PARTICIPATION IN CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 marked the end of 
eight years of efforts to design a program whereby agricultural 
producers would have available cost effective protection from 
natural disasters. The Act of 1980 contained provisions to make 
crop insurance the most attractive form of disaster protection _ 
for the producers protected, the private industry insurance 
marketers, and the taxpayers financing agricultural disaster 
programs. Recent legislation requires that agricultural 
producers must purchase Federal Crop Insurance, if available in 
their area and for their crop, in order to be eligible for low-
interest disaster loans. 
In retrospect, the Federal Crop Insurance has not been as 
widely accepted by producers as had been hoped. Currently, a low 
percentage of qualified acreage is covered by the crop insurance 
program, loss ratios (indemnities to premuims) are higher than 
desired (as high as 150%), the crop insurance product itself is 
complex, and a large number of producers remain uninformed about 
recent improvements in the program. Efforts are being made by 
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, private industry, and 
State University personnel to address these concerns. 
Of concern to these groups, and directly influencing the 
above issues, is a proposal to remove the level of government 
subsidy currently in the crop insurance program. This action, 
according to Classen and Gibson, would raise the national average 
premium cost per acre from $4.68 in 1986 to $19.83 in the future. 
Such a price increase is hypothesized to decrease the cost 
effectiveness of the crop insurance program for producers and 
lower participation rates. 
Several research studies have been completed, and many are 
in progress, exploring provisions of the crop insurance program 
and its cost effectiveness as a risk reducing mechanism for 
agricultural producers. Black set forth two possible 
explanations of low participation rates in the crop insurance 
program. First, that producers were unaware of, or did not 
comprehend the benefits of, the Federal Crop Insurance program or 
any of the recent "improvements". Second, producers preceived 
that the cost of the program (premiums paid) to be greater than 
the preceived benefits (indemnities and protection received). 
Pflueger and Barry recognized that earlier studies 
implicitly assumed independence between the producer's decision 
to participate in the crop insurance program and the financial 
organization of his business. They recognized that lender 
perception of the use of risk reducing strategies could affect a 
producer's financing costs and thereby influence the decision for 
particiaption in crop insurance program. Pflueger and Barry 
found that a borrower participating in a crop insurance program 
had the potential of greater credit availability and thereby 
improve farm survival and liquidity. 
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Leatham, Richardson, and Mccarl examined the lender welfare 
issue of borrower participation in a crop insurance program. 
They recognized that crop insurance can potentially reduce 
lenders' risk by reducing the probability of delinquent and 
defaulted loans while at the same time depleting a firm's 
liquidity and income. From a lender's viewpoint, the decision to 
finance the ' operation is contingent on whether crop insurance 
will reduce credit risk. These authors conclude that at 
insurance loss ratios (ratio of expected indemnity payments to 
expected cost) of less than .58, the probability of firm survival 
was 100 percent and the lender was indifferent to the use/nonuse 
of crop insurance. At loss ratios of greater than .58, both 
lender and producer preferred the use of crop insurance. 
Leatham, Richardson, and Mccarl conclude that at a loss ratio of 
lender which the lender could resolve by adding a small premium 
charge to nonusers of crop insurance thereby encouraging the use 
of crop insurance. 
Pflueger and Barry surveyed lenders' credit response to a 
borrower's use of crop insurance and Leatham, Richardson, and 
Mccarl examined the lenders' risk exposure by a borrower's use of 
crop insurance. However, actual data on lender/borrower 
interaction towards the use of crop insurance was still missing. 
Skees . has stated that, "More research of the nature conducted by · 
Pflueger and Barry is needed." This study was conducted to 
provide . additional information in this area of lender/borrower 
interactions and responds to the informational needs suggested. 
Objectives 
The objective of this study was to provide insight to a crop 
insurance marketing question not previously studied - the 
viewpoint of lenders f ·inancing the premiums for Federal Crop 
Insurance. The viewpoint of lenders as to the extent of which 
their producers were participating in a crop insurance program 
could indicate the current and projected levels of participation, 
the extent to which lenders regard crop insurance programs as 
cost effective risk reducing strategies, and reasons for low 
participation. Thus, a survey of lenders was conducted to 
address the question of lenders' reaction to borrower 
participation in crop insurance programs. 
The objectives of the survey were as follows: 
1. To determine how the removal or reduction of the 
government subsidy might affect participation in crop 
insurancce programs. 
2. To determine lenders' perceptions as to why, and which, 
borrowers may not be purchasing crop insurance. 
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3. To compare lenders' perception of the level of 
participation of their borrowers in the multiple peril 
crop insurance program with participation in private 
hail/fire insurance. 
Data Collection 
A survey was mailed during January 1987 to the senior 
agricultural lending officer at major agricultural lending 
institutions within South Dakota. Lenders comprising the sample 
were affiliated with Farmers Horne Administration (FrnHA), Farm 
Credit Services (FCS), and commercial banks. A follow-up letter 
and survey were mailed three weeks after the initial survey was 
sent. In total, 191 surveys were returned for a response rate of 
56%. Although a survey of producers could have provided 
additioanl insight into this question, many producers were 
experiencing financial difficulties and their responses as to why 
lenders did/did not require crop insurance or finance their 
operation in the absence/presence of crop insurance may have 
biased. Also, as Black has stated, many producers may not be 
familiar with the crop insurance program. 
South Dakota was an excellent place to conduct such a study 
due to the diversity of lender types · and the level of 
particiaption in crop insurance programs. Banking laws within 
South Dakota allow for diversity within the organizational 
structure of the banking community: multi bank holding company, 
affiliate branch banking, and independent banks. (Schmiesing, 
et. al). Also, there is a number of multi peril crop insurance 
policies sold every year in South Dakota; 1.6 million acres of 
crop land insured for $109 million of protection in 1986. In 
addition, the Cooperative Extension Service, South Dakota State 
Unniversity, has released several extension bulletins, lenders 
are included on the mailing list, concerning new provisions and 
recent improvements in the crop insurance program. 
Crop insurance is available to producers either as the multi 
peril crop insurance, commonly refered to as Federal Crop 
Insurance (Federal Crop Insurance can be offered as either multi 
peril insurance or limited peril insurance (hail/fire), but is 
most often associated with the multi peril insurance) or as 
private hail/fire insurance. A distinction between the two was 
made in the survey with the multi peril insurance being refered 
to as Federal Multi Peril Crop Insurance and the limited peril 
insurancce refered to as private hail/fire insurance. 
Survey Results 
In the survey, lenders were asked what percent of their 
borrowers, disregarding borrower risk class, currently purchased 
some form of crop insurance. Lenders were also asked what 
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percent of their borrowers were likely to purchase some form of 
crop insurance in the advent that the governmental subsidy was 
removed from the Federal Crop Insurance program; the possibility 
was detailed in the question and a fifty percent increase in 
premium rates was assumed. Lenders were solicited for their 
opinion as to why producers may not particpate in the Federal 
Crop Insurance program. 
An additional component of the survey requested that lenders 
categorize their responses by risk class of their borrowers. It 
was assumed that lenders would have no problems classifying their 
borrowers as the last two annual survey of lenders conducted by 
the Economics Department, South Dakota State University, had used 
the same classifications of borrower risk classes. This 
delineation of responses is necessary to determine which class of 
borrowers are purchasing, or are being encouraged to purchase, .' 
crop insurance. A concern of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation is that of adverse selection; onlyhigh risk, low 
management ability producers participating in the crop insurance 
program. 
Table 1. shows the number of survey respondents as well as 
the number of survey respondents who provided useable responses 
to the crop insurance questionnaire classified by type of lender. 
Table 1. shows that commercial banks were a predominant 
proportion of the survey sample. The percent of useable 
responses from each class of lender was very strong. 
Table 1. Survey Respondents by Lender Classification 
Lender Class 
Commercial Banks (Banks) 
Farm Credit System (FCS) 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 
Total Respondents (All) 
# of Survey 
Respondents 
147 
13 
31 
191 
# of Useable 
Respondents 
143 
12 
31 
186 
Table 2. gives the percent of borrowers purchasing the 
various types of crop insurance available given the current rates 
for multi peril crop insurance and then assuming a fifty percent 
increase in the premium rates for multi peril crop insurance. 
The numeric values in Table 2. are the mean responses of the 
lenders from the various classifications. Lenders, as shown by 
Table 2., indicated that almost twice the percentage of borrowers 
would select private hail/fire insurance as compared to multi 
peril insurance. For every class of lender, the percent of 
borrowers not purchasing some form of crop insurance was greater 
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than any other category. Purchasing private hail/fire insurance 
was the second most popular selection, and every lender class 
indicated that at least a proportion of their borrowers would 
purchase both multi peril and private hail/fire insurance. 
T-Tests were used to determine the statisitcal significance 
of the diffe~ence in the lenders' response as to what percent of 
their borrowers would purchase the various types of crop 
insurance. T-Tests were used for this analysis since for each 
type of insurance, the independent variable was double bounded; 
the lower bound in each response was zero and the upper bound was 
100 percent. More statistically advance algorithms for analyzing 
the data were not available. Alpha levels of 0.05 and 0.1 were 
chosen on which to determine the confidence interval. 
Table 2. shows that there exists a statistically 
significant difference in the mean response of lenders regarding 
the percent of their borrowers who would purchase some form of 
crop insurance. Generally no statisitically significant 
differences existed in the mean responses of lenders regarding 
the purchase of private hail/fire insurance nor the percent of 
borrowers who would not purcahse any form of crop insurance. The 
inability to show a statistically significant difference is shown 
in the table by no asterisks in the difference column. 
Thus, from Table 2., it can be concluded that, in the 
viewpoirit bf the agiicultural lenders, that the decision to · 
participate in the multi peril crop insurance program is price 
sensitive. When the cost (premiums) of the multi peril crop 
insurance is increased, there is a shift away from multi peril 
crop insurance towards private hail/fire insurance. This 
confirms expectations and is consistent with economic theory. 
Within the survey, lenders were asked to respond to possible 
reasons why borrowers would not be participating in some form of 
crop insurance program and especially in the multi peril crop 
insurance program. Lenders were asked to rank by order of 
importance the following reasons for producers not purchasing 
crop insurance: (1) producers knowledge of crop insurance 
programs; (2) producers need to cut cash outlays regardless of 
risk; (3) costs (premiums) of crop insurance programs exceeding 
the benefits (indemnities); and (4) other reasons that lenders 
could list. By consensus, lenders indicated that the primary 
reason producers did not purchase crop insurance was that costs 
exceeded the benefits. 
Another portion of the survey asked lenders to respond to 
whether their institution sold some form of crop insurance. The 
percentage of each lender classification that did sell some form 
of crop insurance is given in Table 3. The presence of the 
lenders' institution in the crop insurance market could have an 
influence on the percent of their borrowers who did purchase some 
form of crop insurance. It was assumed that lenders who sold 
crop insurance would be more knowledgeable about the product and 
would relate the benefits of crop insurnce to their borrowers. 
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Table 2. Percent of Borrowers Purchasing Crop Insurance 
Classified by Type of Insurance and Lender 
Lender Insurance Current MPCI 50% Higher 
Type Type Rates MPCI Rates Difference 
MPCI 8.50 
FCS Hail/Fire 30.75 
Both 3.75 
Neither 57.00 
MPCI 13.07 
Fm HA Hail/Fire 33.33 
Both 12.04 
Neither 41. 56 
MPCI 13.46 
Banks Hail/Fire 25.50 
Both 8.69 
Neither 52.35 
MPCI 13.03 
All Hail/Fire 27.25 
Both 8.82 
Neither 50.90 
** = Statistically Significant at alpha = .05 
* = Statistically Significant at alpha = .10 
1. 73 7.55 ** 
26.54 3.36 
.91 3.18 ** 
70.82 -14.09 * 
6.36 6.48 ** 
39.36 -5.63 
12.32 -0.74 
41. 96 -0.11 
7.11 6.00 ** 
35.13 -8.73 ** 
5.86 3.03 ** 
51. 90 -0.21 
6.60 6.19 ** 
35.27 -'7. 3 4 · ** 
6.67 2.39 * 
51. 46 -1.17 
Table 3. Percent of Respondents Indicating Presence in Crop Insurance 
Sales by Lender and Insurance Type 
Lender Type % Selling MPCI % Selling Hail/Fire 
Banks 55.24 73.43 
FCS 100.00 100.00 
FmHA 0.00 0.00 
All 48.92 63.98 
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Lenders were asked to respond to questions concerning the 
percentage of their borrowers that they encouraged to purchase 
some form of crop insurance. Lenders responded to questions 
concerning encouragement of the purcahse of either multi peril 
crop insurance or hail/fire insurance. No questions were asked 
regarding encouragement of both types of insurance. 
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Tables 4.-7. give the percentage of borrowers that lenders 
encouraged to purchase some type of crop insurance . As Table 3 . 
indicated that all Farm Credit Services lenders sold both types 
of insurance, and that Farmers Home Administration lenders do not 
sell any insurance, no deliniation of selling insurance among 
these groups is given in Tables 4. and 5. Tables 6. and 7. 
subdivide the responses of lenders from commercial banks and all 
lenders into the categories of selling various types of 
insurance. 
Table 6., and consequently Table 7., presents an interesting 
finding regarding lenders encouragement of borrowers to purchase 
crop insurance and whether they sell insurance. Lenders 
affiliated with commercial banks that sell multi peril crop 
insurance are less likely to encourage borrowers of superior and 
good risk classifications to purchase multi peril crop insurance 
than lenders that do not sell multi peril crop insurance. For 
borrowers in less favorable risk classifications, lenders that do 
sell multi peril crop insurance are more likely to encourage 
their borrowers to purchase multi peril crop insurance than those 
that do not sell multi peril crop insurance. Lenders that sell 
hail/fire insurance displayed opposite tendancies. 
Lenders affiliated with commercial banks that sell multi 
peril crop insurance are more likely to encourage the good, weak 
and inferior risk class borrowers to purchase hail/fire insurance 
than those that do not sell multi peril crop insurance. For 
those lenders of this class that sell hail/fire insurance, they 
encourage fewer of their borrowers in all but the superior risk 
class to purchase hail/fire insurance. In every case, 
disregarding whether lenders sell insurance or not, a greater 
percentage of the higher risk class of borrowers are encouraged 
to purchase some form of crop insurance protection. 
Implications and Conclusions 
The indications of the survey results are clear and merit 
consideration by those associated with the crop insurance 
industry of crop insurance research. The findings of this 
research meet the objectives of the study and indicate three 
distinct considerations for crop insurance research now and into 
the future. Future research needs and implications of this 
research for other firm level research will be presented at the 
end of this section. 
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The three major findings of this research are, first, that 
the survey results indicate that lenders believe borrowers are 
more apt to purchase hail/fire insurance rather than multi peril 
insurance. This finding must be weighed against the fact that, 
according to the American Association of Crop Insurers, the 
primary cause of crop yield loss in south Dakota is from drought 
(49.8%). Thus education efforts may be better directed to 
helping producers identify the causes of their yield loss, and 
strategies or tools that producers can use to manage those 
causes. 
Additionally, this finding implies that a look at 
restructuring the multi peril crop insurance program may be in 
order. A multi peril insurance program that parrallels the 
coverages and costs of existing hail/fire insurance with extended 
coverage against other natural disasters available at additional 
cost may be more attractive to producers. Such a program would 
strongly impact the actuarial structure of the Federal Crop 
Insurance program. Hail/fire coverage would need be issued at 
competitive coverages and costs to producers and then the cost of 
additional coverage would need be differentiated by the cause of 
loss insured against and the charactertistics of the borrower 
and/or his operation. Steps have already been taken along this 
path with the aspect of Actual Production History (APH) 
provisions of the current crop insurance program. 
The second majdr firiding of this study is that, in the view 
of the lenders surveyed, borrowers are sensitive to the cost of 
multi peril crop insurance. Should the governmental 
subsidization be removed from the Federal Crop Insurance program 
and thereby raise the cost of insurance to producers, lenders 
feel · that statistically significantly fewer borrowers will 
purchase multi peril crop insurance with more borrowers 
purchasing hail/fire insurance. Thus, for a program that is 
already concerned with low participation rates, the presence and 
level of governmetal subsidization is crucial. 
The third major finding of this study is that lenders seem 
to feel that crop insurance is not a viable alternative for 
producers who are in a strong financial position. Perceptions of 
program costs exceeding benefits seem to be a factor as lenders 
are only encouraging producers in weaker financial positions to 
purchase crop insurance. The direction and level of lender 
encouragement of their borrowers to purchase crop insurance can 
be related to the work of Pflueger and Barry in which lenders 
were shown to extend more credit to borrowers in weak financial 
positions thereby reaffirming that for some borrowers, crop 
insurance may be a more viable risk management strategy than that 
of self insuring against yield loss. 
While this study has taken steps to fill a void in the 
research pertaining to crop insurance programs, it has perhaps in 
a greater sense pointed to a need for further research along 
these lines. Previous research has shown the need to include the 
financing aspect of a producers crop insurance purchasing 
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decision. This study supports findings of other research by 
showing that while lenders may be more willing to finance the 
premiums of a crop insurance policy, their willingness may be 
directed to those borrowers who can not afford to self insure 
against crop yield loss. Therefore, more research need be done 
to determine which risk management strategies borrowers in strong 
financial po~ition are most likely to adopt. 
Another area of further research is the aspect of borrower 
risk classess. Lenders are differentiating between their 
borrowers; a borrower is not just a borrower. As lenders 
distinguish between risk classes of borrowers, research 
concerning these same producers ought to also distinguish between 
them. Such distinction will become more necessary as lenders use 
these risk classes not only for loan classifications but also for 
loan pricing. 
Additionally, further research could be done on the 
commercial bank aspect presented in this study. If the sample of 
commercial bank lenders could be further subsampled into the 
various affiliations of the banking orgaizational structure, 
further insight into how lenders from different institutions 
would be gained. Also, the aspect of moral hazard needs to be 
examined more closely in light of these research findings. Are 
participants in crop insurance programs in just poor financial 
position, or are they also poor managers? The need for research 
in · the area of producer ri~k · management strategi~s continues· to 
exist and crop insurance research remains an integral portion of 
the risk research area. 
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Table 
Table 
4. Percent of FmHA Lenders 
Purchase Crop Insurance 
Borrower Classifications 
Encouraging Borrowers to 
by Type of Insurance and 
Borrower % Encouraging % Ecouraging 
Classification MPCI 
Superior 64.52 
Good 64.52 
Average 77.42 
Weak 77.42 
Inferior 77.42 
5. Percent of FCS Lenders 
Purchase Crop Insurance 
Borrower Classifications 
Hail/Fire 
54.84 
58.06 
70.97 
74.19 
70.97 
Encouraging Borrowers to 
by Type of Insurance and 
Borrower % Encouraging % Ecouraging 
Classification MPCI Hail/Fire 
Superior 0.00 0.00 
Good 0.00 0.00 
Average 15.38 23.08 
Weak 61. 54 84.62 
Inferior 69.23 84.62 
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Table 6. 
Borrower 
Classification 
Percent of Commercial Bank Lenders Encouraging 
Borrowers to Purchase Crop Insurance by Type of 
Insurance and Borrower and Lender Classification 
Multi Peril Insurance Hail/Fire Insurance 
Do Sell Do Not Sell Do Sell Do Not Sell 
Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase MPCI 
Superior 3.80 
Good 13.92 
Average 37.98 
Weak 59.49 
Inferior 60.76 
6.25 
14.06 
31. 25 
42.19 
43.75 
2.86 0.00 
10.48 0.00 
30.47 100.00 
47.62 100.00 
50.48 100.00 
Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase Hail/Fire 
Superior 7.59 10.94 8.57 0.00 
Good 16.46 14.06 15.24 100.00 
Average 41. 77 42.19 40.00 100.00 
Weak 63.29 54.69 58.10 100.00 
Inferior 64.56 53.13 60.00 100.00 
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Table 7. Percent of All Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to 
Purchase Crop Insurance by Type of Insurance and 
Borrower and Lender Classification 
Multi Peril Insurance Hail/Fire Insurance 
Borrower 
Classification Do Sell Do Not Sell Do Sell Do Not Sell 
Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase MPCI 
Superior 3.30 24.21 3.36 32.84 
Good 12.09 29.47 10.08 40.30 
Average 35.17 45.26 29.41 59.70 
Weak 60.44 52.63 49.58 68.66 
Inferior 62.44 53.68 52.94 67.16 
Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase Hail/Fire 
Superior 6.59 
Good 14.29 
Average 39.65 
Weak 67.03 
Inferior 68.13 
25.26 
28.42 
51. 58 
61. 05 
58.95 
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8.40 
14.29 
38.66 
61. 34 
62.18 
29.85 
34.33 
58.21 
68.66 
65.67 
, 
